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This paper builds a theoretical foundation for the dynamics of knowledge sharing in private
industry. In practice, research and development projects can take years or even decades to
complete. We model an uncertain research process, where research projects consist of multiple
sequential steps. We ask how the incentives to license intermediate steps to rivals change
over time as the research project approaches maturity and the uncertainty that the ﬁrms
face decreases. Such a dynamic approach allows us to analyze the interaction between how
close the ﬁrms are to product market competition and how intense that competition is. If
product market competition is relatively moderate, the lagging ﬁrm is expected never to drop
out and the incentives to share intermediate research outcomes decreases monotonically with
progress. However, if product market competition is relatively intense, the incentives to share
may increase with progress. These results illustrate under what circumstances it is necessary
to have policies aimed at encouraging cooperation in R&D and when such policies should be
directed towards early vs. later stage research.
JEL Codes: L24,O30,D81
Keywords: Multi-stage R&D; innovation; knowledge sharing; licensing; dynamic games.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper builds a theoretical foundation for the dynamics of knowledge sharing in private
industry. As evidenced by the substantial evidence on licensing, research alliances and joint
ventures, knowledge sharing arrangements are a central way in which ﬁrms acquire technolog-
ical knowledge. From a social welfare perspective, sharing of research outcomes is desirable
because it results in less duplication. Since the 1980s, governments in the US and Europe
have actively promoted joint R&D projects through subsidies, tolerant antitrust treatment,
and government-industry partnerships.1 At the same time, economics research has studied
the private and social incentives to have knowledge sharing arrangements, focusing on issues
of appropriability and spillovers. However, none of these studies has focused on the basic
dynamics of private sharing incentives. Research projects in industries such as biotechnology
and computers can take years or even decades to complete. Over such long time horizons,
there is considerable scope for the sharing strategies of ﬁrms to change. Firms may decide
to share some intermediate steps, but not all of their research outcomes. For example, Oxley
and Sampson (2004) show that direct competitors choose to limit the scope of their alliances
to activities which can be considered to be further away from the product market.2 Focusing
on the dynamics of research, we ask how the incentives to license research outcomes to rivals
change over time as a research project approaches maturity.
A question central to the policy debate as well as the study of knowledge sharing arrange-
ments is the impact of competition on cooperation. This is because in many cases, the most
suitable research partner for a ﬁrm may be one of its competitors. However, such sharing poses
especially diﬃcult challenges because they may result in a reduction in the commercial value of
the ﬁrms’ R&D eﬀorts. Hence, it is important to determine how close proﬁt-driven ﬁrms come
1For example, in the US, the National Cooperative Research and Production Act (NCRPA) of 1993 provides
that research and production joint ventures be subject to a ‘rule of reason’ analysis instead of a per se prohibition
in antitrust litigation. In the EU, the Commission Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000 (the EU Regulation) provides
for a block exemption from antitrust laws for RJVs, provided that they satisfy certain market share restrictions
and allow all joint venture participants to access the outcomes of the research.
2Oxley and Sampson (2004) base their study on a sample of R&D alliances involving companies in the
electronics and telecommunications equipment industries. They deﬁne the scope of alliances in terms of R&D,
manufacturing and marketing activities, and show that competitors are averse to adding joint manufacturing
and marketing activities to their R&D collaborations. In a study of biotechnology alliances, Lerner and Merges
(1998) ﬁnd that while in a few cases the alliances covered technologies well along the way to regulatory approval,
in most cases they were arranged at the earliest stages of research (prior to animal studies, clinical trials and
regulatory approval).
1to maximizing welfare. A dynamic perspective allows us to analyze the impact of competition
on cooperation in two diﬀerent ways. We can analyze the impact of both how close the ﬁrms
are to product market competition and how intense that competition is. Our results reveal an
interesting interaction between these two factors.
From a dynamic perspective, the process of research is generally characterized by a high
level of uncertainty in the beginning. For example, at the outset of a research on a new medical
drug, the expected success rate may be as low as 2% and the expected time to market may be
more than a decade.3 In such environments, progress in research can be described as a decrease
in the level of uncertainty that researchers face. By the time a new drug is a few years from
market, there is far less uncertainty about its chance of success and value than at the outset.
One of the novel aspects of this project is to focus on the role uncertainty plays in the decisions
to share knowledge and to analyze how ﬁrms’ incentives to share research outcomes change
during a research process as the level of uncertainty they face decreases. We show that the
impact of uncertainty on ﬁrms’ sharing incentives depends on the intensity of product market
competition.
We assume that research projects consist of several sequential steps. Researchers cannot
proceed to the next step before successfully completing the prior step. Moreover, they cannot
earn any proﬁts before completing all steps of the project. An important feature of the model
is that we assume the diﬀerent steps of research are symmetric in all respects except in regards
to how far away they are from the end of the project. That is, the options and technology
available to the ﬁrms are the same in all steps of the research process. We deliberately assume
that there are no spillovers in research.4 It has been stressed in the literature that ﬁrms may
have higher spillover rates and bigger appropriability problems in earlier stages of research than
in later stages of research.5 Although the rate of spillovers may shape the dynamics of sharing,
we show that this is not the only factor that matters. Assuming that there are no spillovers
between the research eﬀorts of diﬀerent ﬁrms allows us to focus on the role uncertainty plays
in knowledge sharing.
3See Northrup (2005).
4In the literature on research joint ventures, knowledge spillovers are stated as one of the most important
reasons for rival ﬁrms to agree to share knowledge.
5See, for example, Katz (1986), Katz and Ordover (1990), and Vonortas (1994).
2We assume that ﬁrms are informed about the progress of their rivals and make joint sharing
decisions after each success. In a dynamic R&D process, ﬁrms’ incentives to share change as
their positions in the race change for two reasons. First, the probability that the ﬁrms will
survive to be rivals in the product market changes with progress. Second, the ability of the
leading ﬁrm to earn monopoly proﬁts depends on the progress the ﬁrms make during the
research process. Because sharing decreases the lead of one ﬁrm, it reduces the expected
proﬁts that the leader derives from ﬁnishing the race ﬁrst and being a monopolist for some
period of time. This cost may be even greater if, but for the sharing, the lagging ﬁrm would
drop out of the race.
The results reveal that the nature of the sharing dynamics depends critically on whether
product market competition allows for the co-existence of competing ﬁrms. If duopoly proﬁts
are relatively high, ﬁrms that are lagging in the research phase would pursue duopoly proﬁts
rather than exiting. In this case, the incentives to share intermediate research outcomes de-
creases monotonically with progress. However, if duopoly proﬁts are relatively low, a lagging
ﬁrm exits the race once it falls behind (e.g., as in a winner-take-all-market). In this case, the
incentives to share intermediate research outcomes may be weakest early on.
These results have important implications for policy-making in innovation environments.
They show that the design of optimal knowledge sharing policy should be sensitive to the
dynamic sharing patterns which would emerge in the absence of such policy. What is needed
to encourage sharing in early stages of an innovation may be diﬀerent from what is needed
to encourage sharing in later stages. Moreover, whether policies should be optimally directed
towards early stage or later stage research may depend on the particular industry because of
diﬀerences in the intensity of competition.
As mentioned above, the impact of competition on cooperation in R&D has also been the
focus of many papers in the economics literature. These papers have mainly studied ﬁrms’
incentives to share research outcomes at one point in time, either before the start of research, as
in the case of research joint ventures, or after the development of a technology, as in the case of
licensing.6 A general result in these papers is that the intensity of product market competition
6See, for example, Kamien (1992) on licensing, and Reinganum (1981), Katz (1986), D’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) on research joint ventures. Patenting and informal
sharing between employees of ﬁrms are two other methods through which knowledge may be disseminated
3decreases the incentives to cooperate.7 We contribute to this literature by focusing on the
dynamics of sharing.
In addition to contributing to the literature on knowledge sharing, this paper is also related
to the literature on how ﬁrms’ optimal strategies change over time in a dynamic model of R&D.
In this literature, Grossman and Shapiro (1986 and 1987) analyze how ﬁrms vary their research
eﬀorts over the course of a research project. In an inﬁnite-period race, Cabral (2003) allows
ﬁrms to choose between two research paths with diﬀerent levels of riskiness. He shows that
the leader chooses a safe technology and the laggard chooses a risky one. Judd (2003) shows
that there is excessive risk-taking by innovators.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the set-up and explain, as a
benchmark, what happens if the ﬁrms are allowed to collude in the product market. In section
3, we deﬁne the monotonicity property which we use in our characterization of the sharing
dynamics under rivalry. In section 4, we analyze the eﬀect of competition on the dynamic
sharing incentives of ﬁrms in a model with ex-post sharing contracts and two research steps.
T h ec a s eo fN research steps is considered in section 5. In sections 6 and 7, we discuss extensions
of our basic model with asymmetric ﬁrms and patenting of research outcomes, respectively.
We conclude in section 8.
2M o d e l
S i n c ew ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nt h ee ﬀect of competition on ﬁrms’ incentives to share, we consider
an environment with two ﬁrms, i =1 ,2, which invest in a research project. On completion of
the project, a ﬁrm can produce output in a product market. We will consider Markov Perfect
Equilibria (MPE), where each ﬁrm maximizes its discounted expected continuation payoﬀ given
the Markov strategy of the other ﬁrm. Before describing the payoﬀsa n dt h eM P E ,w eﬁrst
give an overview of the research and production phases.
between ﬁrms. See, for example, Scotchmer and Green (1990) on early innovators’ incentives to patent and
Severinov (2001) on informal sharing between employees.
7For example, Choi (1993) shows that competing ﬁrms will cooperate if the level of spillovers are suﬃciently
high. Wang (2002) shows that licensing between competitors will take place if they produce suﬃciently diﬀeren-
tiated products. Empirical evidence suggests that ﬁrms do take measures to avoid opportunistic behavior when
they are collaborating with their competitors. For example, Majewski (2004) shows that direct competitors
are more likely to outsource their collaborative R&D. Oxley and Sampson (2004) show that direct competitors
choose to limit the scope of alliance activities.
42.1 Research Environment
To capture the idea of progress, we assume that a research project has N distinct steps of equal
diﬃculty. Hence, we assume that the ﬁrms divide the research project into diﬀerent steps and
that each ﬁrm deﬁnes the steps in the same way. A ﬁrm cannot start to work on the next step
before completing the prior step, and all steps of the project need to be completed successfully
before a ﬁrm can produce output.
There is no diﬀerence between the steps in terms of the technology or the options available
to the ﬁrms. This is because we seek to derive endogenous diﬀerences in the research phases
that result from the dynamics in the decisions made by the ﬁrms. A basic intuition is that as
ﬁrms approach the end of the research process, their decisions might increasingly reﬂect the
impending rivalry.
We assume that each ﬁrm operates an independent research facility. We model research
activity using a Poisson discovery process. Time is continuous, and the ﬁrms share a common
discount rate r. To conduct research, a ﬁrm must incur a ﬂow cost c per unit of time.8
Investment provides a stochastic time of success that is exponentially distributed with hazard
rate α. This implies that at each instant of time, the probability that the ﬁrm completes a
step is α. After completing a step, a ﬁrm can immediately begin research on the next step.
For a ﬁrm which has not yet completed the project, a decision not to invest the ﬂow cost c is
assumed to be irreversible and equivalent to dropping out of the game.
When one ﬁrm (the leading ﬁrm) successfully completes a stage of research before the other
ﬁrm (the lagging ﬁrm) does, we assume that the leading ﬁrm can share this knowledge with the
lagging ﬁrm and thereby save the lagging ﬁrm from having to continue to invest to complete the
stage. From the point of view of social eﬃciency, such sharing will always be eﬃcient because
it prevents resources from being spent to duplicate research results. There are a variety of
ways to model the sharing process. We consider ex post sharing or licensing, where the leading
ﬁrm shares its result with the lagging ﬁrm in exchange for a licensing fee. Sharing can occur
instantaneously whenever one ﬁrm has completed more stages of research than the other. The
8We do not allow the ﬁr m st oc h o o s ec o n t i n u o u sl e v e l so fr e s e a r c he ﬀort. This assumption can be motivated
by presuming a ﬁxed amount of eﬀo r tt h a te a c hﬁrm can exert, which is determined by the capacity of its R&D
division. As an example, Khanna and Iansiti (1997) explain that given the highly specialized nature of the
R&D involved in designing state-of-the-art mainframe computers, ﬁr m si nt h i si n d u s t r yﬁnd it very expensive
to increase the number of researchers available to them.
5leader makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the lagging ﬁrm. If the lagging ﬁrm accepts the oﬀer,
he pays the licensing fee to the leader who then shares one step of research. After the sharing
takes place, each ﬁrm that is not yet done with the project decides whether or not to invest.
Regarding the information structure, we assume that the lagging ﬁrm cannot observe the
technical content of the rival’s research without explicit sharing.9 In this sense, there are no
technological spillovers. Everything else in the game is common knowledge. In particular,
ﬁrms observe whether their rival is conducting research as well as whether the rival has a
success. Third parties such as courts also observe this information and can enforce the licensing
contracts.
2.2 Product Market Competition
After a ﬁrm completes all stages of the research process, it can participate in the product
market. The ﬁrms produce goods that may be either homogeneous or diﬀerentiated, and
that they compete as duopolists in the product market.10 We represent the product market
competition in the following reduced form way.
If both ﬁrms have completed the research project, they compete as duopolists and each
earns a ﬂow proﬁto fπD ≥ 0 forever. If only one ﬁrm has completed the research project, the
ﬁrm earns a monopoly ﬂow proﬁto fπM > 0 as long as the other ﬁrm does not produce output.
Here, πM >π D. As a benchmark, we will consider the case that the ﬁrms make production
decisions to maximize their joint proﬁts in the product market. This results in a joint ﬂow
proﬁto fπJ where πJ ≥ 2πD and πJ ≥ πM.W eu s et h en o t a t i o ne πD = πD
r , e πM = πM
r ,a n d
e πJ = πJ
r .
These payoﬀsa r es u ﬃciently ﬂexible to capture various models of product competition.
For example, if the ﬁrms produce homogeneous products and compete as Bertrand or Cournot
competitors, then πJ = πM > 2πD.I ft h eﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated products, then πJ >π M
and the relationship between πM and 2πD will depend on the degree of product diﬀerentiation
9Alternatively, we could assume that research results can be copied, but successful ﬁrms win immediate
patents. A leading ﬁrm could then prevent a lagging ﬁrm from copying its research by enforcing its patent. If
the patent does not prevent the rival from developing a non-infringing technology at the same ﬂow cost c and
w i t ht h es a m eh a z a r dr a t e ,t h e nt h ef o r m a ls e tu pw o u l db ee q u i v a l e n tt oo u r s . W ec o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e n
patenting changes the research cost of the lagging ﬁrm in section 7.
10We assume that the ﬁrms conduct the research to solve the same technical problem. However, unmodelled
diﬀerences in production technologies can still lead them to produce diﬀerentiated products.
6that exists between the products. For low levels of product diﬀerentiation, πM > 2πD; for high
levels of product diﬀerentiation, πM ≤ 2πD.11




where 0 <γ<1 so that the products are substitutes.12 The goods are less diﬀerentiated the
higher is γ. It is possible to show that πM ≤ 2πD i fa n do n l yi fγ is suﬃciently small.
To denote the space for technology and proﬁt parameters, we use Ω = {ω =(α,r,c,πM,πD)
such that 0 <α<1,0 <r<1,c>0,πM >π D ≥ 0}.
2.3 Research Histories, Equilibrium, and Payoﬀs
Research histories To represent the progress made by the ﬁrms, we deﬁne a set of research
histories.13 We use the notation h =( h1,h 2),w h e r ehi stands for the number of steps that
ﬁrm i has completed. When ﬁrm i completes a research step, hi increases by one. From a
dynamic perspective, what matters is whether one research history precedes another. The
research histories are partially ordered so that h is earlier than h0 if and only if hi ≤ h0
i
for i =1 ,2, with strict inequality for at least one ﬁrm. In the following analysis, we refer
to research histories where h1 = h2 as symmetric histories and to those where h1 6= h2 as
asymmetric histories.
If a ﬁrm has dropped out of the game, we use X to denote this in the research history. The
set of research histories is
H = {((h1,h 2),(h1,X),(X,h2) for hi =1 ,...N and i =1 ,2}
Markov strategies and equilibrium We will restrict attention to strategies that depend
only on the research histories in H. At each history, the set of available actions for ﬁrm i is
as follows. At symmetric histories (h,h) with h<Nand for the histories (h,X) or (X,h)
with h<N , active ﬁrms simultaneously decide whether or not to invest in the next step of
research. An inactive ﬁrm is out of the game and so chooses no action. At the histories (N,N),
(N,X) and (X,N), active ﬁrms earn monopoly or duopoly proﬁts in the product market. At
11The magnitudes of π
D, π
J and π
M do not depend on the decisions taken during the research phase.
12Singh and Vives (1984) show how these demand functions derive from particular consumer preferences. The
Hotelling model provides another example of a diﬀerentiated duopoly.
13A research history is not a full history of the game, but rather a state variable that captures the payoﬀ
relevant history of the game.
7(N,N),t h eﬁrms earn duopoly proﬁts. At (N,X) and (X,N),t h ea c t i v eﬁrm earns monopoly
proﬁts. At asymmetric histories (h1,h 2) where h1 6= h2,t h eﬁrms move in sequence. First,
the leading ﬁrm makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the lagging ﬁrm. Next, the lagging ﬁrm
chooses whether to accept the oﬀer. If the lagging ﬁrm accepts, the history transitions to either
(h1 +1 ,h 2) or (h1,h 2 +1 )depending on which ﬁrm is the leader. If the lagging ﬁrm rejects
the oﬀer, then if hi <N, ﬁrm i decides whether or not to invest in the next step of research.
If both ﬁrms are choosing whether to invest, they do so simultaneously. If hi = N, ﬁrm i earns
monopoly proﬁts in the product market.
A pure Markov strategy is a function on H that speciﬁes an action for ﬁrm i at each
history. A pure Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
pure Markov strategies.
Payoﬀs The payoﬀso fe a c hﬁrm are functions of the current history and the equilibrium
strategies. The equilibrium value functions Vi(h) for i =1 ,2 are given by a Bellman equation.
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e−rtπMdt = e πM
V1 (X,h2)=V1 (X,X)=0
We use VJ = V1 + V2 to refer to the joint payoﬀso ft h eﬁrms.
Licensing fees If the ﬁrms share at an asymmetric history (h1,h 2) in equilibrium, the
lagging ﬁrm pays the leading ﬁrm an licensing fee F (h1,h 2). The Bellman equation for ﬁrm 1
8is
V1 (h1,h 2)=F (h1,h 2)+V1 (h1,h 2 +1 ) if h1 >h 2
V1 (h1,h 2)=V1 (h1 +1 ,h 2) − F (h1,h 2) if h1 <h 2.
The Bellman equation V2 for ﬁrm 2 is deﬁned similarly.
The leading ﬁrm makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the lagging ﬁrm. Because the leading
ﬁrm has all the bargaining power, it oﬀers an equilibrium licensing fee that leaves the lagging
ﬁrm just indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting. Assuming ﬁrm 2 is the lagging ﬁrm, the
licensing fee is equal to
F(h1,h 2)=V2 (h1,h 2 +1 )− V2 (h1,h 2;NS),( 1 )
where V2 (h1,h 2;NS) denotes the equilibrium value function conditional on the ﬁrms deciding
not to share at (h1,h 2).T od e r i v eVi (h1,h 2;NS), we assume the ﬁrms do not share at (h1,h 2)
and follow the equilibrium thereafter.
2.4 Joint Proﬁt Maximization
As a benchmark, we brieﬂy consider what the ﬁrms would do if they could make all of their
decisions (investment, sharing and production) jointly. In the product market, it is optimal
for the ﬁrms to cooperate and earn ﬂow proﬁts of πJ.S i n c eπJ ≥ πM, this is the best they can
do. During the research process, it is always optimal for the ﬁrms to share research successes
as soon as one of them is ahead of the other. If one ﬁrm has successfully completed a step,
investing to duplicate the research is purely wasteful. Since the ﬁrms make the production
decision jointly, there is no reason for them to incur this extra cost.
Since costs are incurred upfront before the ﬂow of proﬁts begin, the incentive to invest is
weakest at the beginning of the game and grows over time as the ﬁrms complete more steps
of research. The expected joint payoﬀs at any point in time are increasing in α and πJ and
decreasing in r and c.T h e ﬁrms invest provided the expected payoﬀsa r ep o s i t i v e . I nt h e
Poisson discovery process with identical ﬁrms, if it is optimal for one ﬁrm to invest in a step,
then it is optimal for both to invest even if the ﬁrms could agree to have just one of them to
invest. This speeds up the time to innovation, and the beneﬁts of the time savings outweigh
9the costs of running simultaneous facilities.14
3 Sharing Dynamics
We are interested in determining the impact of competition on cooperation. Given our dynamic
framework, we explore how the incentives to share change over time for rivalrous ﬁrms. In
this section, we introduce a monotonicity property to formalize the idea of dynamic sharing
incentives which decrease over time.
Because each of the research steps in our model is identical from a technology standpoint, a
conclusion that sharing incentives must change over time is not obvious. Certainly, if one ﬁrm
is ahead of the other, this may impact the ﬁrm’s individual choices. However, if we consider
the histories (h0+1,h 0) and (h+1,h) with h0 <h , it is not obvious that the sharing incentives
should be any diﬀerent. In both cases, the leader is one step ahead of the lagging ﬁrm. Sharing
is socially eﬃcient in both cases. The history (h0 +1 ,h 0) is, however, earlier than the history
(h+1,h). At the earlier history, there is more uncertainty to be resolved before the ﬁrms enter
the product market and there is a longer future of strategic interaction. We want to consider
how these diﬀerences aﬀect the ﬁrms’ decisions.
The number of steps that the lagging ﬁrm is behind is a factor in the ﬁrms’ sharing decisions.
We control for this, however, by comparing histories such that the lagging ﬁrm is a ﬁxed number
of steps behind the leading ﬁrm. We compare sharing incentives at all histories (h+g,h) where
g>0 is a ﬁxed gap between the leading ﬁrm and the lagging ﬁrm. The size of the gap can be
as small as 1 or as large as N − 1.
Because the sharing decision is made jointly, the ﬁrms share whenever it raises their joint
proﬁts. At (h + g,h), sharing changes the history to (h + g,h+1 ) . The following equilibrium
sharing condition is central to our analysis:
VJ (h + g,h+1 )>V J (h + g,h;NS),( 2 )
where VJ = V1 + V2 i st h ej o i n tv a l u ef u n c t i o n .
14Indeed, if there were any number of identical research facilities, then it would be optimal for all of them to
conduct research simultaneously until one of the facilities achieves a success. This result does not hold if the
ﬁrms are suﬃciently asymmetric in their research capabilities.
10A sharing pattern is an ordered sequence of sharing decisions covering all histories with the
same gap. For example, when N =2 , the sharing pattern for the case when the leader is one
step ahead of the lagging ﬁrm speciﬁes sharing decisions at (1,0) and (2,1).F o rN =2 , there
is only one sharing pattern, where g =1 .F o r l a r g e r N, there is a sharing pattern for each
gap g =1 ,...,N−1. The next deﬁnition states a formal monotonicity property for the general
N-step model. We deﬁne the property for histories such that ﬁrm 1 is the leader. Because the
equilibria in our game are symmetric, when the property holds, it also holds for histories such
that ﬁrm 2 is the leader.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium satisﬁes the monotonicity property if whenever the ﬁrms share
at the history (h + g,h), then they also share at the earlier history (h0 + g,h0) where h0 <h .
Here h and h0 range from 0 to N − g and g =1 ,...,N− 1.
A sharing pattern is monotonic if once ﬁrms stop sharing, they never share again. Hence,
when the property holds, sharing incentives may be said to decline over time as the ﬁrms
approach the end of the game. For N =2 , there are four possible sharing patterns: (S,S),
(S,NS), (NS,NS), and (NS,S). All patterns except (NS,S) are monotonic.
4 Two-step Research Process
We are now in a position to analyze the model when N =2 . Our central question is whether
the ﬁrms’ incentives to share decline over time as they approach the product market. That
is, we ask whether the equilibrium sharing pattern is monotonic. Because the project has two
steps, there are six histories at which one ﬁrm has more knowledge than the other. These are
the histories (1,0), (0,1), (2,0), (0,2), (2,1) and (1,2).
There are two principle motivations for ﬁrms to decide against sharing. First, if the lagging
ﬁrm continues to research, it will take longer to ﬁnish the project allowing a longer expected
period of monopoly proﬁts for the leading ﬁrm. Second, if the lagging ﬁrm exits the game,
the leader can expect to earn monopoly proﬁts forever upon ﬁnishing. It turns out that these
two motivations can lead to diﬀerent dynamics over time. We consider environments with and
without exit separately.
114 . 1 D y n a m i c so fS h a r i n gW h e nF i r m sd on o tE x i tt h eG a m e
In this section, we prove our main monotonicity result that the ﬁrms’ incentives to share
decline over time. The incentive to share depends on the joint proﬁts of the two ﬁrms, not
their individual proﬁts. We discuss the dynamics of the individual proﬁts and the licensing
fees that the lagging ﬁrm pays to the leading ﬁrm at the end of the section after presenting
the monotonicity result.
We start by distinguishing parameter regions with and without exit.
Deﬁnition 2 Region A consists of those parameter values such that in every Markov perfect
equilibrium of the game, ﬁrms do not exit at any history either on the equilibrium path or oﬀ
the equilibrium path. Region B consists of all other parameter values.
Region A is given as follows:
Lemma 1 Region A consists of all parameters such that πD ≥ c r
α(2 + r
α).
The proof of Lemma 1 focuses on a ﬁrm that is as far behind the leader as possible when
the leader has not shared its research. Because the lagging ﬁrm does not have any bargaining
power, its payoﬀ if there is no sharing at (2,0) is the payoﬀ it would get by conducting the
two steps of research on its own and then producing in the output market as a duopolist.
Intuitively, this is the worst possible position for a ﬁrm. We show that the lagging ﬁrm stays







This inequality implies that environments without exit arise when competition in the prod-
uct market is relatively soft and the costs of research (time and money) are not prohibitive.
Otherwise, if the product market competition will be intense, then we are in Region B where
a lagging ﬁrm drops out at one or more histories.
Because the ﬁrms never exit in Region A, solving the game for its equilibria reduces to deter-
mining the sharing decisions of the ﬁrms. The next proposition records our main monotonicity
result.
Proposition 1 In Region A, every MPE sharing pattern is monotonic.
12The proposition is proved in the appendix where we solve for the equilibria in Region A.
There is a unique MPE except on boundaries between the subregions of Region A where some
equilibrium action changes. The proposition implies that whenever the ﬁrms share at the
history (2,1), they also share at the earlier history (1,0). Therefore, we would expect to see
only the monotonic sharing patterns: (S,S), (S,NS) and (NS,NS). The sharing pattern (NS,S)
never arises in Region A. Hence, if sharing breaks down, it breaks down as the ﬁrms approach
t h et i m ew h e nt h e yw i l lb ec o m p e t i t o r s .
We explain the reasons behind Proposition 1 by discussing the sharing conditions at (2,1)
and (1,0).A t b o t h h i s t o r i e s , t h e ﬁrms share if and only if doing so increases their joint
continuation proﬁts. The beneﬁt of sharing is the savings of duplicated R&D costs for one
step of research. Sharing also has the beneﬁt of bringing the product market proﬁts forward.
H o w e v e r ,t h o s ep r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁts may be reduced as a result of sharing since sharing
decreases the leader’s ability to earn monopoly proﬁts. The sharing decision depends upon the
balance of these costs and beneﬁts.
Formally, ﬁrms share at (2,1) if VJ(2,2) >V J(2,1;NS).I ft h eﬁrms share, they compete
as duopolists in the product market and earn joint ﬂow proﬁts of 2πD. Their continuation
proﬁts are VJ(2,2) = 2e πD.I ft h eﬁrms do not share, the leading ﬁrm earns a ﬂow proﬁto fπM




πM − c + αVJ(2,2)
¢
dt. The sharing condition simpliﬁes to
2πD − (πM − c) > 0. (3)
At the earlier history (1,0), the sharing condition is VJ(1,1) >V J(1,0;NS).T h e j o i n t
payoﬀsa t(1,1) and (1,0;NS) depend on future sharing decisions at (2,1) and (2,0). Hence,
we consider these decisions ﬁrst.
First, consider the case when condition (3) fails,15 so the ﬁrms do not share at (2,1).A s
shown in the appendix, the sharing condition at (2,0) is the same as the sharing condition at
(2,1).T h u s ,t h eﬁrms do not share at (2,0) either. To understand why, note that sharing at
(2,0) changes the history to (2,1) and allows the lagging ﬁrm to reach the product market
sooner. When this happens, the ﬂow proﬁts (πM − c) are replaced by the ﬂow proﬁts 2πD for
15By failing, we mean that the inequality in condition (3) is reversed. The special case that the condition
holds with equality is considered in the appendix and is discussed further below.
13an e tl o s so f2πD − (πM − c). To avoid this loss, the ﬁrms do not share at (2,0).
Now, consider the sharing condition at (1,0).A t(1,0), there is a new beneﬁt of sharing
that did not exist at (2,1). The lagging ﬁrm now has a chance of ﬁnishing ﬁrst. If the ﬁrms
knew that ﬁrm 2 would ﬁnish ﬁrst, they would want to share at (1,0) so as to realize monopoly
proﬁts sooner. In contrast, if the ﬁrms knew that ﬁrm 1 would ﬁnish ﬁrst, then they would
not want to share at (1,0) because this shortens the duration of monopoly proﬁts. We can
re-write the sharing condition (21) in the appendix in the following way:
β(πM + c)+( 1− β)(2πD − (πM − c)) > 0,( 4 )
where β =
(α+r)2
(2α+r)2. The second term in (4) is the net loss in joint ﬂow proﬁts when the leading
ﬁrm ﬁnishes ﬁrst. This is the same as condition (3) and is negative. The ﬁrst term in (4) is the
increase in joint ﬂow proﬁts when the lagging ﬁrm ﬁnishes ﬁrst. Here, the ﬁrms jointly beneﬁt
from replacing the lagging ﬁrm’s R&D costs −c with monopoly proﬁts πM. The net beneﬁt,
πM +c, is positive. The β and (1−β) can be interpreted as weighted probabilities, where ﬂow
proﬁts that arrive earlier in time have greater weight. There is a weighted probability β that
the lagging ﬁrm ﬁnishes ﬁrst and a weighted probability (1 − β) that the leading ﬁrm ﬁnishes
ﬁrst. Since β>0, condition (4) is easier to satisfy than (3) so that the monotonicity result
holds. At (2,1), β =0because the leading ﬁrm was already done.
When condition (4) holds, there is a unique MPE with the sharing pattern (S,NS). When
it fails, there is a unique MPE with the sharing pattern (NS,NS). When the condition holds
with equality, there are two MPEs, one for each sharing pattern.
Next, consider the case when condition (3) holds, so the ﬁrms share at (2,1).A s s h o w n
in the appendix, the sharing condition at (2,0) is again the same as the sharing condition at
(2,1) and is given by condition (3). Thus, the ﬁrms share at (2,0) also.
As shown in the appendix, the sharing condition at (1,0) simpliﬁes to
πD + c>0,( 5 )
which holds trivially and implies that the equilibrium sharing pattern is (S,S). Since the ﬁrms
share at both (2,1) and (2,0), neither ﬁrm can ever earn monopoly proﬁts and, thus, there is
no cost to sharing at (1,0). Sharing merely reduces the expected time to market and expected
R&D costs by enabling the lagging ﬁrm to ﬁnish sooner. The sharing condition captures the
14change in joint ﬂow proﬁts when this happens. When the lagging ﬁrm reaches the history
(1,2),t h eﬁrms share so that both ﬁrms enter the product market. As shown in (5), the joint
ﬂow proﬁts increase from −2c to 2πD for a net beneﬁto f2(πD + c) > 0. Sharing at (1,0)
creates this beneﬁt by enabling the ﬁrms to reach the history (1,2) sooner and with a higher
probability. Clearly, condition (5) is easier to satisfy than condition (3) in so far as it holds
for more parameter values.
In summary, there are two explanations for why sharing patterns are monotonic. The ﬁrst
explanation is that if the ﬁrms do not share at (2,1), sharing at (1,0) may still be beneﬁcial
because it enables the lagging ﬁrm to ﬁnish ﬁrst and earn monopoly proﬁts sooner. The second
explanation is that future sharing at (2,1) and (2,0) eliminates the ability of either ﬁrm to
earn monopoly proﬁts. This eliminates the cost of sharing earlier in the game and explains
why (5) holds trivially. It is interesting to note that the dynamics described above continue
to hold when research costs c are zero. In particular, savings of duplicated R&D costs are not
the only reason the ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to share. Firms are also motivated to share so that
they can reduce the time needed for one or both to reach the product market.
4.1.1 Comparative Statics
We next consider how the extent of sharing is aﬀected by changes in parameters to better
understand the dynamic motivations for sharing. From Proposition 1, we can describe a
monotonic sharing pattern by the number of histories in which the ﬁrms choose to share. For
example, (NS,NS) implies that there are no histories with sharing while (S,NS) implies that
there is one and (S,S) implies that there are two histories with sharing.
Corollary 1 Consider any ω =( α,r,c,πM,πD) and ω0=( α0,r0,c 0,πM0
,πD0
) in Region A such
that α ≤ α0,r≥ r0,c≥ c0,πM ≤ πM0
and πD ≥ πD0
.S e l e c taM P Ea tω and ω0 and consider
the associated sharing patterns. There are weakly more histories with sharing at ω than at ω0.
The Corollary is proved by an examination of the sharing conditions given in (3), (4), and
(5). Intuitively, it is clear that an increase in duopoly proﬁts, πD, or in the research cost,
c, increases the attractiveness of sharing. Both enter with a positive sign in each sharing
condition. The eﬀects of the other parameters are less obvious.
15First, consider the comparative statics result for monopoly proﬁts, πM. Condition (3)
implies that an increase in πM decreases the incentive to share at (2,1). T h i si sb e c a u s e
sharing erodes the monopoly proﬁts of the leading ﬁrm. At the earlier history (1,0),h o w e v e r ,
t h er o l eo fπM is more complex. As seen in (5), if the ﬁrms share at (2,1), then an increase
in πM has no eﬀect on the sharing decision at (1,0). T h i si sb e c a u s et h eﬁrms never earn
monopoly proﬁts due to future sharing. If the ﬁrms do not share at (2,1),a ni n c r e a s ei nπM
can either increase or decrease the incentive to share at (1,0). As shown in (4), if β<1
2,t h e
sharing condition at (1,0) gives more weight to the erosion of monopoly proﬁts for the leading
ﬁrm, (2πD − (πM − c)). This term is decreasing in πM.I fβ>1
2, the sharing condition gives
more weight to the beneﬁt of sharing for the lagging ﬁrm, πM + c, which is increasing in πM.
Corollary 1 states that an increase in πM always results in fewer histories with sharing. When
β<1
2, this is clearly true. When β>1
2, the result holds weakly because, even though the
underlying eﬀect of an increase in πM is to increase the incentives to share, the ﬁrms share at
(1,0) regardless of πM. To see this, note that the lowest value of πM in our parameter space
is πM = πD. At this value of πM,i fβ>1
2, condition (4) holds. For larger πM,t h u s ,t h e
condition also holds.
Next, consider the comparative statics results for r and α. Of the three sharing conditions
above, the only one aﬀected by r and α is (4). This is the condition for sharing at (1,0) if
the ﬁrms do not share at (2,1).16 The parameters r and α enter (4) through the parameter β
which is increasing in r
α.T h er a t i or
α can be interpreted as a discount factor. The underlying
interest rate r is adjusted by the eﬀectiveness α of the research technology. As r
α increases,
the ﬁrms become more impatient and so place more weight on reducing the delay until at least
one of them enters the product market and less weight on extending the duration of monopoly
proﬁts. This makes sharing more appealing. In fact, for β>1
2, sharing at (1,0) is always
optimal, even for arbitrarily large values of πM.
Figure 1 lists the sharing patterns for diﬀerent regions. The parameters α,r, and c are ﬁxed,
but πD and πM are allowed to vary. The right hand side of the diagram, where πD ≥ c r
α(2+ r
α),
depicts the equilibrium outcomes in Region A. Consider how the sharing pattern changes as
16The sharing condition (3) at (2,1) is not aﬀected by
r
α because the cost and beneﬁt of sharing are incurred
a tt h es a m et i m ei nt h eﬂow of proﬁts. Similarly, in the sharing condition (5) at (1,0), when the ﬁrms share at
(2,1),
r
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Outcomes for α = .5, r = .2 and c = .5
πM increases for a given value of πD.T h ev a l u e so fr and α yield β<1
2 so that an increase in
πM i n c r e a s e st h ei n c e n t i v et oc h o o s eN Sa ta l lt h eh i s t o r i e s .F o rs m a l lv a l u e so fπM,t h es h a r i n g
pattern is (S,S). As monopoly proﬁts increase, sharing breaks down at the history (2,1) and
the sharing pattern is (S,NS). As monopoly proﬁts increase further, sharing eventually breaks
down at the earlier history (1,0) as well, so the sharing pattern is (NS,NS). Hence, as πM
increases, sharing breaks down, but it breaks down at later histories ﬁrst.
4.1.2 Licensing Fees
To ﬁnish, we brieﬂy discuss individual payoﬀs and licensing fees. Since sharing decisions are
made jointly, they do not depend on this analysis. However, it is still interesting to consider
the dynamics of the licensing fees. In light of the monotonicity we have observed in the sharing
incentives, a natural question that arises is whether the licensing fees display a similar type
of dynamics. We ﬁnd that this is not necessarily the case. Although the joint incentives to
share decline over time, the licensing fees paid by the lagging ﬁrm may increase or decrease
17over time depending on the magnitude of r
α.
Recall that whenever the ﬁrms share, the leading ﬁrm makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
the lagging ﬁrm. Since the leading ﬁrm has all the bargaining power, it oﬀers a licensing fee
that leaves the lagging ﬁrm just indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting. In section C of
the appendix, we analyze an MPE in which the ﬁrms share at all histories. We ﬁnd that both
ﬁrms have a higher payoﬀ at (2,1) than at (1,0). Essentially, this is because costs are invested
upfront while proﬁts are earned later and are discounted. Hence, as the game progresses,
individual payoﬀsr i s e .F o rt h i sr e a s o n ,i f r
α is suﬃciently high, the licensing fees also increase
over time. This is in contrast with the sharing incentives which decrease over time.
For suﬃciently small values of r
α, the dynamics of the sharing incentives do, however,
determine the dynamics of the licensing fees. The beneﬁt from sharing to the lagging ﬁrm (as
opposed to the joint beneﬁt) is higher at (1,0) than at (2,1) because at (1,0), sharing helps the
lagging ﬁrm to ﬁnish ﬁrst and earn a licensing fee at (1,2).T h i se ﬀect dominates for suﬃciently
small values of r
α and F(1,0) >F (2,1). T h i si sb e c a u s ew h e n r
α is small, discounting does
not reduce the payoﬀs early in the game by much. Since discounting plays a smaller role
than the sharing dynamics in the determination of the licensing fees, the licensing fees display
a monotonic pattern consistent with the pattern of the sharing incentives. Hence, whether
licensing fees have the same dynamics as the sharing incentives depends on how impatient the
ﬁrms are to reach the product market.
4 . 2 D y n a m i c so fS h a r i n gW h e nF i r m sE x i tt h eG a m e
We next consider region B. In this region, a lagging ﬁrm may exit the game if the leader does
not share at some history. Competition in the product market is suﬃciently intense or research
costs are suﬃciently high so that ﬁrms may exit when they fall behind. This introduces an
important strategic motive for a leading ﬁrm to refuse to share. Our question is whether, in
light of this, the pattern of sharing continues to satisfy the monotonicity property. We ﬁnd
that this is not the case. A lagging ﬁr mm a yb em o r el i k e l yt od r o po u te a r l i e ri nt h eg a m e ,
when it has more research left to complete. Given this, a leading ﬁr mm a yb el e s sl i k e l yt o
share earlier in the game.
Proposition 2 In Region B, for an open set of parameters, there is a MPE such that the
18ﬁrms share at (2,1) but not at (1,0), where both histories arise on the equilibrium path.
The proposition is proved in the appendix. For a region of parameter values, we demon-
strate a unique equilibrium in which a non-monotonic sharing pattern arises on the equilibrium
path. The ﬁrms share at (2,1), but they do not share at (1,0). This is because by not sharing
at (1,0), the ﬁrms can reach the history (2,0).A t(2,0),t h eﬁrms do not share and the lagging
ﬁrm drops out. The leading ﬁrm then earns monopoly proﬁts forever. In the equilibrium,
(2,0;NS) is the only history at which the lagging ﬁrm drops out. At (2,1;NS) and (1,0;NS),
the lagging ﬁrm stays in the race. Thus, the ﬁrms have a strong incentive to forego sharing at
(1,0) in order to reach (2,0). A non-monotonic sharing pattern arises on the equilibrium path
when, after choosing not to share at (1,0),t h eﬁrms next reach the history (1,1) rather than
(2,0). The game then proceeds to (2,1) or (1,2),a tw h i c hp o i n tt h eﬁrms share step 2.
In a companion appendix, we solve for all of the equilibria of the model.17 There, we
demonstrate another equilibrium where the monotonicity property fails. In that equilibrium,
the ﬁrms choose not to share at (1,0) because then the lagging ﬁrm immediately drops out.
Because of this, the ﬁrms never reach the history (2,1) on the equilibrium path. They do share
at (2,1) oﬀ the equilibrium path however, so technically the monotonicity property fails.
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium outcomes in the case when we see non-monotonic sharing
patterns both on and oﬀ the equilibrium path.18 The two regions with the non-monotonic






. In the region to
the left of this line, the lagging ﬁrm drops out at the history (1,0) if the ﬁrms do not share.
Thus, an observer of the game would not observe a non-monotonicity. In the region to the
right of the line, the lagging ﬁrm stays in the game at the history (1,0) if the ﬁrms do not
share. Because of this, an observer of the game would observe a non-monotonicity.
Although we have demonstrated how the possibility of drop out may result in no sharing,
it is important to note that it may also increase the incentives to share. That is, the ﬁrms
sometimes share at (1,0) in Region B to keep the lagging ﬁrm in the race. This happens on the






, where the sharing pattern
17The appendix is available at http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/nerkal/homepage/index.htm.
18There are multiple equilibria at (0,0) in some of the regions. Both ﬁrms can be in or both ﬁrms can be out
at (0,0). In the diagram, we selected the equilibrium such that both ﬁrms invest at (0,0).I nt h ec o m p a n i o n
appendix, some of the regions shown above are further divided because we specify the sharing decision at (2,0)
also.
19is (S,NS). The ﬁrms share at (1,0) despite the fact that the lagging ﬁrm would immediately
drop out otherwise. Sharing enhances joint proﬁts because the lagging ﬁrm may ﬁnish the
race faster than the leading ﬁrm, so that monopoly proﬁts are earned sooner. In this region,
there are also multiple equilibria at (0,0),o n ew h e r eb o t hﬁrms invest and another one where
neither ﬁrms invests. When both ﬁrms invest, the ﬁrms beneﬁt from each other’s presence
because of future sharing at (1,0) and (0,1). But for this sharing, neither would have wanted
to invest at (0,0).
T h el e f th a n ds i d eo fF i g u r e1a l s os h o w st h a ti ft h eﬁrms play a winner-take-all game, they
may have incentives to share early in the game. We interpret the game as a winner-take-all
game when the ﬁrms do not share at (2,1) and the lagging ﬁrm then drops out. As can be seen
on the left hand side of Figure 1, we would always expect the ﬁrms to share the ﬁrst research
step in this case. This is because the ﬁrms will never compete as duopolists and they can
maximize joint proﬁts by reaching the product market as quickly as possible. Sharing allows
them to achieve exactly this. It is important to point out that it is not the level of spillovers
which explains the sharing between the ﬁrms. Rather, it is the dynamics of competition.
The results in sections 4.1 and 4.2 relate to a fundamental question in the economics of
R&D on how competition aﬀects the incentives for cooperation in R&D. They reveal that the
dynamic impact of competition on cooperation is complex. The sharing incentives may either
increase or decrease throughout a research process. In less competitive industries (where, as
in Region A, the lagging ﬁrm pursues duopoly proﬁts rather than exiting), the ﬁrms will have
decreasing incentives to share. In more competitive industries (where, as in Region B, the lag-
ging ﬁrm exits at some histories), the ﬁrms may have either decreasing or increasing incentives
to share. As discussed in the conclusion, these res u l t sh a v ei m p l i c a t i o n sf o rg o v e r n m e n tp o l i c y
towards sharing arrangements.
5 N-step Research Process
In this section, we discuss some results obtained in a model with N research steps of equal
diﬃculty as robustness check. We focus on the main question of whether the sharing patterns in
Region A continue to be monotonic. We ﬁrst consider the case when N =3 . Lemma 1 extends
in a straightforward way and Region A is the set of parameters such that the lagging ﬁrm stays








The next proposition states how the result in Proposition 1 extends to a model with three
research steps.
Proposition 3 Suppose N =3 . In Region A, every MPE sharing pattern is monotonic.
To prove the proposition, we derive the equilibria as we did for the case of N =2 .T h e s e
derivations are available on request. With a three-step research process, we can compare the
sharing incentives at the histories where the leader is one step ahead of the lagging ﬁrm (i.e.,
at (1,0), (2,1),a n d(3,2))a sw e l la sa tt h eh i s t o r i e sw h e r et h el e a d e ri st w os t e p sa h e a do ft h e
lagging ﬁrm (i.e., at (2,0) and (3,1)). Proposition 3 implies that both types of sharing patterns
are monotonic. For the histories (1,0), (2,1),a n d(3,2), there exist parameter values where the
equilibrium sharing decisions are (S,S,S), (S,S,NS), (S,NS,NS) or (NS,NS,NS). For the histories
(2,0) and (3,1), there exist parameter values where the equilibrium sharing decisions are (S,S),
(S,NS) or (NS,NS).19
The sharing condition at all histories such that one ﬁrm is ﬁnished is again given by (3).
When this condition holds, the ﬁrms share at the histories (3,0),(3,1) and (3,2). This removes
the possibility of monopoly proﬁts, so the ﬁrms share at all earlier histories also. The sharing
condition at all earlier histories is given by (5). When (3) fails, the ﬁrms do not share at
(3,0), (3,1),o r(3,2). At all earlier histories and in every equilibrium, the equilibrium sharing
condition has the form
β(πM + c)+( 1− β)(2πD − (πM − c)) > 0,( 6 )
where β ∈ (0,1) depends on the history and the future sharing decisions. In each equilibrium,
when we compare the sharing conditions at two histories with the same gap, we ﬁnd that the
value of β is higher at the earlier history. This gives us the monotonicity result.
The main intuition for this monotonicity result is the following. While the ﬁrms jointly
decide whether to share, the basic trade-oﬀ they face is between maintaining the leader’s lead
19In Region A, when (3) holds, the unique MPE sharing pattern is (S,S,S) if the gap between the ﬁrms is one
(g =1 )a n d( S , S )i fg =2 . When (3) fails, for small
r
α, the unique MPE sharing pattern is (NS,NS,NS) for
g =1and (NS,NS) for g =2 .A s
r
α increases, the unique MPE sharing pattern becomes (S,NS,NS) for g =1
and (NS,NS) for g =2 , then (S,S,NS) for g =1and (NS,NS) for g =2 , and then (S,S,NS) for g =1and (S,NS)
for g =2 .
21so that he can earn monopoly proﬁt sf o rl o n g e rp e r i o do ft i m ew h e nh eﬁnishes ﬁrst and
enabling the lagging ﬁrm to ﬁnish ﬁrst at an earlier point in time. Note that at symmetric
histories, each ﬁrm has an ex ante 50% chance of ﬁnishing ﬁrst. When one ﬁrm is ahead by
one step, that ﬁrm has more than a 50% chance of ﬁnishing ﬁrst. Because of this, the concern
about keeping the leader’s lead has a greater weight in the decision than if the ﬁrms were in
a symmetric position. The monotonicity result follows because as the game progresses, the
weight put on this concern increases. That is, as the game progresses, a lead of a ﬁxed number
of steps gives the leading ﬁrm a greater chance of ﬁnishing ﬁrst. To see this, note that at the
history (N,N −1), since the leader is done, his lead gives him a 100% chance of ﬁnishing ﬁrst.
The sharing condition in this case places no weight on the beneﬁt of enabling the lagging ﬁrm
to ﬁnish ﬁrst (β =0 ) because the lagging ﬁrm cannot ﬁnish ﬁrst. When the game is longer,
however, the fact that the leader is one step ahead does not give him a 100% chance of ﬁnishing
ﬁrst. In fact, the longer is the game, the closer the leader’s chance of ﬁn i s h i n gi st o5 0 % . 20
Hence, there is a lower and lower weight placed on the concern about keeping the leader’s lead.
Thus, the ﬁrms have increasing incentives to share as we go back in time.
The monotonicity result cannot be strengthened to comparisons between histories such that
the leading ﬁrm is ahead by a diﬀering number of steps. For example, we ﬁnd an equilibrium
such that the ﬁrms share at (2,1), but do not share at the earlier history (2,0).T h er e a s o n
is that at (2,0), the leading ﬁrm is further ahead and has more to give up in terms of forgone
monopoly proﬁts.
We expect that Proposition 1 could be extended further to a model with N research steps.21
However, we have not proved this because the equilibrium calculations become too cumber-
some. Instead, we analyzed a related problem that we interpret as a partial generalization of
our monotonicity result. Consider any starting history (h +1 ,h) in the N-step model such
that the leading ﬁrm is one step ahead of the lagging ﬁrm. Assume that at all histories after
(h +1 ,h) the ﬁrms do not share and they also do not exit the game.22 Under this assump-
20Note that β above is not literally the ex ante probability that the lagging ﬁrm ﬁnishes ﬁrst. It is a normalized,
weighted discount factor corresponding to changes in the ﬂow of joint proﬁts that occur when sharing causes
the lagging ﬁrm to ﬁnish earlier and before the leading ﬁrm. When these changes occur earlier in time, they
receive a higher weight.
21Note that Region A shrinks as N increases because a lagging ﬁrm has a lower payoﬀ from staying in the
game at (N,0) than at (N − 1,0).R e g i o nBg r o w sa sR e g i o nAs h r i n k ss i n c et h e ya r ec o m p l e m e n t a r ys e t s .
22We know from the analysis in section 4.1 that if the ﬁrms always share in the future, the sharing condition
22tion, we can derive formulas representing the ﬁrms’ joint continuation payoﬀs and compare the
continuation payoﬀs from sharing and not sharing at (h+1,h). The sharing condition always
has the form (6), so we can deﬁne β(h +1 ,h). Numerical analysis reveals that β(h +1 ,h) is
decreasing in h for N ≤ 20.23 This means that if the sharing condition holds at the history
(h +1 ,h), then it holds at all earlier histories (h0 +1 ,h 0) where h0 <h . The result is diﬀerent
from Proposition 1 because the assumptions about the ﬁrms’ behavior after (h+1,h) may not
be consistent with any equilibrium.24 However, the result is consistent with the intuition that
the incentives to share decline over time when ﬁrms never exit.
6A s y m m e t r i c F i r m s
So far we have assumed that the ﬁrms are symmetric in their research capabilities. This
allowed us to focus on the impact of uncertainty and progress on the ﬁrms’ sharing decisions.
In this section, we relax the symmetry assumption by allowing the ﬁrms to have diﬀerent
research costs. This allows us to consider two environments that commonly arise in practice,
where there is a dominant research ﬁrm and where ﬁrms have diﬀerent abilities to conduct
diﬀerent stages of research.25 We have two results. First, we show that if one of the ﬁrms
is more eﬃcient at conducting research, sharing patterns continue to be monotonic in Region
A. Second, we show that if one of the ﬁr m si sm o r ee ﬃcient at ﬁrst-stage research than at
second-stage research, then the monotonicity result may be violated.
Let the research costs of ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 be c1 and c2, respectively. To start with, we
assume that ﬁrm 1 is more eﬃcient than ﬁrm 2 so that c1 <c 2. Each ﬁrm has the same cost of
research in both stages. Hence, there is symmetry across the diﬀerent stages of research for each
holds trivially because there is no cost to sharing. We are considering the other extreme here and assume that
the ﬁr m sn e v e rs h a r ei nt h ef u t u r e .T h i sa l l o w su st of o c u so nt h ei n t u i t i o nt h a tt h ef u r t h e ra w a yt h eﬁrms are
from the end of the research process, the more uncertainty they face and the more willing they may be to share.
23We compared the payoﬀs by evaluating them on a discrete grid of parameter values. The formulas appear to
besuﬃciently continuous that we do not expect we missed any singularities in our simulations. The computations
are available on request.
24However, based on our discussion in section 1, we conjecture that such an equilibrium would exist for




α suﬃciently small, the ﬁrms do not exit the game at any history. Moreover,
as
r
α decreases, ﬁrms become more patient and are less concerned with reducing the delay until the lagging ﬁrm
enters the product market. Since the beneﬁt from sharing decreases, we expect there to be a unique MPE such
that the ﬁrms choose NS at every history and never drop out of the game.
25In the biotechnology industry, for example, alliances often involve a ﬁr mw h i c hh a sd e v e l o p e de x p e r t i s ei n
research on a particular biotechnology and a large pharmaceutical which may be better able to bring the product
through the clinical testing and regulatory approval process to the market. See Lerner and Merges (1998).
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Because of the cost asymmetry, sharing at the history (h+g,h) no longer implies sharing at
the history (h,h+g).I nl i g h to ft h i s ,w en o wd e ﬁne a sharing pattern as an ordered sequence
of sharing decisions covering all histories with the same gap and with the same ﬁrm acting as
the leader. This implies, for N =2 , there are two sharing patterns for each equilibrium, one
associated with each ﬁrm being the leader. The following deﬁnition states the monotonicity
property separately for each ﬁrm.
Deﬁnition 3 An equilibrium satisﬁes the monotonicity property for ﬁrm 1 (respectively for
ﬁrm 2) if whenever the ﬁrms share at the history (2,1) (respectively (1,2)), then they also
share at the earlier history (1,0) (respectively (0,1)).
We analyze whether both sharing patterns are monotonic in Region A, where both ﬁrms
invest at every history. Consider the histories (2,1) and (1,2). As in the previous analysis, the
cost of sharing is πM −2πD. The sharing condition at (2,1) is c2 >π M −2πD and the sharing
condition at (1,2) is c1 >π M − 2πD.B e c a u s ec1 <c 2, the sharing condition at (2,1) is easier
to satisfy. This leaves us with three cases: i) The ﬁrms share at both histories, ii) the ﬁrms
share at neither history, and iii) the ﬁrms share at (2,1) but not at (1,2).
Proceeding in the same way as we did in the symmetric case, we have the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that ﬁrm 1’s research cost is c1, ﬁrm 2’s research cost is c2 >c 1,
and that the ﬁrms have the same research cost in both stages of the research process. Then, in
Region A, every MPE sharing pattern is monotonic.
Proposition 4, proved in the appendix, states that sharing patterns continue to be monotonic
even if the ﬁrms diﬀer in their research costs. As long as each ﬁrm’s research costs do not
change over time, the ﬁrms receive higher joint beneﬁts from sharing earlier rather than later in
the research process for essentially the same reasons as in the symmetric model. The scenario
that is most interesting to consider is when, due to the asymmetry in their research costs, the
ﬁrms share at (2,1) but not at (1,2). This occurs when c2 >π M − 2πD >c 1. For the sharing
24patterns where ﬁrm 1 is the leader to be monotonic, the ﬁrms must share at (1,0) since they
share at (2,1). As shown in the appendix, this is indeed the case. Intuitively, this can be
understood as follows. Because the ﬁrms share at (2,1), ﬁrm 1 does not forego any future
monopoly proﬁts by sharing at (1,0). On the other hand, sharing at (1,0) makes it more likely
that ﬁrm 2 will ﬁnish ﬁrst. Sharing also eliminates duplicative research on stage 1.T h u s ,t h e r e
is no downside to sharing at (1,0). Since the ﬁrms start to make joint ﬂow proﬁts of πM − c1
instead of −(c1 + c2), the sharing condition at (1,0) is πM + c2 > 0.
Since the ﬁrms do not share at (1,2), it is trivially the case that all sharing patterns with
ﬁrm 2 as the leader are monotonic. The sharing condition at (0,1), however, has some interest.
From (33) in the appendix, it is given by
β(2πD + c1 + c2)+( 1− β)(2πD − πM + c1) > 0,( 7 )
where β =
(α+r)2
(2α+r)2. The ﬁrst term in (7), 2πD + c1 + c2, is positive. It arises because sharing
at (0,1) helps the ﬁrms reach (2,1).A t(2,1), the ﬁrms share and joint ﬂow proﬁts increase
from −(c1 + c2) to 2πD. Sharing at (0,1) thus brings about cost savings for both ﬁrms. In
particular, the higher is the leader’s cost c2, the greater is the incentive to share. The second
term in (7) is negative because πM −2πD >c 1. This is the usual loss that arises when, due to
sharing, the lagging ﬁrm erodes the monopoly proﬁts of the leading ﬁrm. In the equilibrium,
the beneﬁti nt h eﬁrst term dominates the loss in the second term, and the ﬁr m sa l w a y ss h a r e
at (0,1). Hence, future sharing at (2,1) is suﬃcient to induce sharing at both of the earlier
histories (1,0) and (0,1) even though the ﬁrms do not share at (1,2).
Next, we consider a diﬀerent type of asymmetry, where one of the ﬁrms is better at one stage
of research than at the other stage of research. Suppose, as above, that ﬁrm 1 has a cost of c1
in both stages, but ﬁrm 2 has a cost of c1
2 in the ﬁrst stage and c2
2 in the second stage. The only





such that 0 <α<1, 0 <r<1, c1 > 0, c1
2 > 0, c2
2 > 0, πM >π D ≥ 0
ª
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As above, we restrict our attention to Region A, where both ﬁrms invest at every history.
We ﬁnd that all sharing patterns where ﬁrm 2 is the leader are monotonic although non-
monotonicity may arise in sharing patterns where ﬁrm 1 is the leader.











25stage 2. Then, in Region A, every MPE sharing pattern with ﬁrm 2 as the leader is monotonic.
If c1
2 > c2
2, every MPE sharing pattern with ﬁrm 1 as the leader is monotonic. For some values
of c1
2 <c 2
2, however, there exists a MPE with a non-monotonic sharing pattern.
The novel result in Proposition 5 is that if the ﬁrms share at (2,1), they do not necessarily
share at (1,0).26 When ﬁrm 2 has increasing costs, the sharing patterns where ﬁrm 1 is the
leader may be non-monotonic. To explore this, we derive an equilibrium in the appendix where
the ﬁrms share at the four histories (2,1), (1,2), (2,0) and (0,2). From (34) in the appendix,
the sharing condition at (1,0) is
β
¡





2) > 0,( 8 )
where β = α
(3α+r). The new term c1
2 − c2
2 captures the change in investment costs when the
lagging ﬁrm stops research on step 1 and begins research on step 2.I fc1
2−c2
2 < 0,t h i si sal o s s
and (8) does not always hold. When (8) fails, the ﬁrms share at (2,1) but not at (1,0).B y
not sharing at (1,0),t h eﬁrms prevent ﬁrm 2 from starting to work on step 2, where it would
incur high research costs. If ﬁrm 1 subsequently completes step 2, ﬁrm 2 will never have to
work on it. The ﬁrms would attain even higher joint proﬁts if ﬁrm 2 were simply to refrain
from conducting further research at (1,0). However, by assumption, the ﬁrms cannot agree to
this.
Hence, the analysis reveals that the impact of research costs on sharing incentives depends
on whether we are considering current or future research costs. While an increase in the ﬁrst-
stage research cost of ﬁrm 2, c1
2, makes sharing at (1,0) more attractive, an increase in the
second-stage research cost, c2
2, makes sharing at (1,0) less attractive. This contrasts with our
comparative statics conclusions from section 4.1, where an increase in c always made sharing
more attractive.
These results extend the results under symmetry, showing that the monotonicity result of
section 4.1 is not a special phenomenon of symmetric environments. They describe what type
of sharing dynamics we would expect to see in industries where there is a dominant research
ﬁrm and in industries where diﬀerent ﬁrms specialize in diﬀerent stages of the research process.
In most of the cases we considered, we have found that as ﬁrms approach the point of rivalry,
26Recall that in the symmetric model, the sharing condition at (1,0), given by (5), holds trivially.
26their incentives to cooperate break down. However, if the research costs of one of the ﬁrms
increase over time, the ﬁrms may choose not to share earlier on, but choose to share later on
when they are closer to product market competition. Thus, changes in research costs over time
may lead to sharing dynamics that are not monotonic.
7 Patent Policy
We next discuss the impact of patent policy on the dynamics of sharing. So far we have assumed
that once a ﬁrm successfully develops a research step, it can either keep the technology secret
or patent it. If there is patenting, the lagging ﬁrm can develop a noninfringing technology
that serves the same purpose and continues to face the same research cost. In this section,
we assume that patenting increases the lagging ﬁrm’s research cost by forcing it to work
around the patent of the leader. Stronger patent policy (i.e., broader patent protection) may
make it harder for rival ﬁrms to invent around (Gallini, 1992).27 Accordingly, we assume
that a strengthening of patent policy increases the lagging ﬁrm’s research cost. We show that
stronger patent protection, as long asi td o e sn o tc a u s ee x i tb yt h el a g g i n gﬁrm, increases the
incentives to share. However, if stronger patent protection increases the incentives to exit, it
may decrease the incentives to share. Thus, as in our basic model, the incentives to drop out
play a crucial role in the results.28
We assume that both steps of the research process are patentable and, as soon as a ﬁrm
successfully completes a stage, it gets a patent. The ﬁrms have symmetric costs c at the
histories (0,0) and (1,1), when they are working towards the same research step. After one
of the ﬁrms completes the next stage, the lagging ﬁrm cannot continue to work on the same
research path because doing so would imply infringement. Hence, if it decides to stay in the
game, it has two options. It can either make a licensing deal with the leader or switch to a
more expensive research path with cost cP >c . On this more expensive path, the ﬁrm invests
to complete the research process in a noninfringing way.29
27The concept of patent scope has been interpreted in several diﬀerent ways in the literature on optimal
patent policy. See Scotchmer (2004) for a discussion of the diﬀerent models.
28Bar (2006) and Fershtman and Markovich (2006) also explore the impact of patent policy in a dynamic
R&D process, focusing on diﬀerent research questions. Bar (2006) studies the strategic incentives to publish
R&D results in a dynamic R&D process. Fershtman and Markovich (2006) study the eﬀects of diﬀerent patent
policy regimes on the speed of innovation in an asymmetric dynamic R&D race.
29Hence, we assume that there are diﬀerent research paths the ﬁrms can take to achieve the same research
27This set-up implies that the ﬁr m sf a c ea s y m m e t r i cr e s e a r c hc osts at asymmetric histories.
W h i l ei ns e c t i o n6w eh a v ec o n s i d e r e dd i ﬀerent types of ﬁrms, in this section we assume the
ﬁrms are symmetric to start with, but they become asymmetric as the game progresses and
the ﬁrms successfully develop the diﬀerent research steps. We assume that patenting in both
stages aﬀects the research cost of the lagging ﬁrm in the same way by increasing it from c to
cP.
As in the previous section, we focus on Region A and explore how the sharing incentives
change over time and when the sharing patterns are monotonic in this region.30 The derivations
are straightforward and available on request. Because the ﬁrms are not inherently asymmetric,
we use the same monotonicity deﬁnition as the one in section 3. The sharing condition at the
histories (2,1) and (1,2) is given by
2πD − (πM − cP) > 0. (9)
This is also the sharing condition at (2,0) and (0,2).W h e n( 9 )i ss a t i s ﬁed, the ﬁrms share at
all the future histories after (1,0) and (0,1). The sharing condition at (1,0) and (0,1) is given
by





where β = 2α
4α+r.31 The ﬁrst term πD + c i st h es a m ea si n( 5 ) ,a n di st h eb e n e ﬁt of sharing
that arises when the lagging ﬁrm ﬁnishes earlier due to sharing. The second term is also a
gain since cP ≥ c. T h i si st h ec h a n g ei nt h eﬁrms’ joint ﬂow proﬁts which arises when the
lagging ﬁrm stops working to circumvent the patent on step 1 and instead conducts research on
step 2. The condition (5) holds trivially, so the monotonicity property holds. Hence, sharing
incentives decrease over time in environments where patenting makes research more costly for
the lagging ﬁrm.
A policy to strengthen patent protection causes an increase in the cost parameter cP.T o
analyze this, we consider how the cost parameter cP enters the sharing conditions (9) and (10).
outcome and the diﬀerent research paths correspond to diﬀerent research costs. If one of the ﬁrms gets a patent,
the follower has to switch to another research path to avoid infringement.
30As in previous sections, Region A is deﬁned by the drop out condition for the lagging ﬁrm at the history







31Note that when c
P = c, this is the same condition as in the symmetric model.
28Since cP enters both conditions with a positive sign, a strengthening of patent policy increases
the beneﬁts from sharing. This is because the policy aﬀects the lagging ﬁrm’s outside option.
Since the lagging ﬁrm has to incur higher research costs following the patenting decision of
the leader, it will be willing to pay a higher licensing fee to the leader in exchange for the
technology. Hence, with broader patent protection, we would expect the extent of sharing to
increase because the ﬁrms can save on higher costs of research.
This conclusion however may not always be true if a strengthening of patent policy changes
the investment decisions. If an increase in the lagging ﬁrm’s research cost cPcauses it to exit
at some histories, we are in Region B. Here, a strengthening in patent policy increases the
incentive for the lagging ﬁrm to exit. From the analysis in section 4.2, we know that the ﬁrms
may decide against sharing to cause the lagging ﬁrm to exit. This is because the leading ﬁrm
upon ﬁnishing will earn monopoly proﬁts forever. In Region A, patents by deﬁnition do not
confer monopoly proﬁts forever. It is possible that a strengthening of patent policy would
shift the game from Region A to Region B. In this case, the policy could reduce the extent of
sharing. Moreover, if the new equilibrium is non-monotonic, sharing could break down early
in the research process even if it does not break down at the end. Thus, in practice, predicting
the eﬀect of patent policy requires knowledge of whether exit is likely (as in a winner-take-all
environment) or whether several ﬁrms could proﬁtably pursue the research to its conclusion.
8C o n c l u s i o n
The paper considers the optimal pattern of knowledge sharing in the context of technological
competition. We have analyzed how the incentives to share change over time as a research
project reaches maturity. Developing a theoretical foundation for optimal sharing strategies
has important implications for the design of optimal as well as eﬃcient research environments.
The results show that both how close the ﬁrms are to product market competition and how
intense that competition is shape the ﬁrms’ sharing behavior. If product market competition
is moderate and the lagging ﬁrm is expected never to drop out under rivalry, the incentives to
share intermediate research outcomes decreases monotonically with progress. If the product
market competition is intense and the lagging ﬁrm is expected to drop out, the incentives to
share may increase with progress.
29The prevalence of sharing in early stages of research in certain industries, often attributed
to eﬃciencies of internalizing spillovers, could be due in part to these competitive dynamics.
Thus, to the extent that the competitive dynamics matter, the propensity to share in early
stages would not indicate its higher value. The monotonicity result is also consistent with the
existing evidence that direct competitors choose to limit the scope of their alliance to activities
which can be considered to be further away from the product market (Oxley and Sampson,
2004).
As robustness check, we have investigated whether the monotonicity result continues to
hold if we have an N-step research process, if the ﬁrms are asymmetric, and if patenting
increases the research cost of the lagging ﬁrm. These results show us under what types of
conditions we would expect the monotonicity result to continue to hold. Speciﬁcally, we have
shown that the monotonicity result may be violated if there is asymmetry across the diﬀerent
stages of research for one of the ﬁrms.
One assumption we have made in our analysis is that the lagging ﬁrm has no bargaining
power. Consider how a diﬀerent distribution of bargaining power between the two ﬁrms would
aﬀect the results. The distribution of bargaining power does not aﬀect the joint payoﬀs, but
it aﬀects the individual payoﬀs. Hence, with a change in the ﬁrms’ bargaining powers, the
incentives to share would not be aﬀected, ceteris paribus, because the sharing decisions are
made based on joint proﬁts. However, since the individual payoﬀso ft h eﬁrms would change,
the investment incentives would change. In particular, Region A (where neither ﬁrm drops
out at any of the histories) would expand to include more parameters because the lagging ﬁrm
would have a greater incentive to stay in the game.
Our results suggest new directions for empirical research on innovation. Although there is a
large literature on research alliances, there has been little prior empirical research focusing on
the dynamics of these alliances. Our theoretical work focuses on the dynamics of sharing where
the intensity of product market competition, the diﬃculty of research, and the impatience
of ﬁrms are the key factors. Future research could address whether these dynamics can be
identiﬁed and empirically distinguished from the impact of other dynamic variables, such as
the intensity of spillovers, ﬁnancing issues, and the degree of antitrust risk, which are also likely
shape the patterns of sharing in industries where innovation is important. The role played by
30each factor may depend on the industry and the nature of the research.32
Our results oﬀer insights to guide policy-making in innovation environments. Since the
1980s, governments in the US and in Europe have used subsidies, tolerant antitrust treat-
ment, and government-industry partnerships to promote joint R&D projects. Considering the
dynamics of sharing incentives and distinguishing between the factors which may shape these
incentives would help in determining under what circumstances such policies are necessary and
whether they should be directed towards early vs. later stage research. If, as in our model,
product market competition drives the dynamics of sharing, the monotonicity result stated in
Proposition 1 implies that in less competitive industries (where lagging ﬁrms pursue duopoly
proﬁts rather than exiting), ﬁrms are likely to have lower incentives to share in later stages of
research than in early stages. In this case, policies that encourage sharing in later stages when
private incentives to share are the weakest may have the greatest value. In contrast, Propo-
sition 2 implies that in more competitive industries, such as industries with a winner-take-all
structure, ﬁrms may have lower incentives to share in early stages of research than in later
stages. In this case, policies that encourage sharing in early stages in order to keep lagging
ﬁrms in the market may have the greatest value.
32For example, Lerner and Merges (1998) ﬁnd that in the biotechnology industry, it is the R&D ﬁrms’ need
for ﬁnancing which may cause alliances to form at the earlier stages of research.
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companion appendix, we prove this by solving for all of the equilibria (see footnote 17). Here,
instead, we focus on the payoﬀ that a ﬁrm would earn by conducting two steps of research
on its own and producing in the output market as a duopolist. This is a lower bound on any
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ at any history and in any equilibrium. In Region A, the payoﬀ of the lagging ﬁrm
at (2,0) equals this payoﬀ.I ft h eﬁrms decide not to share at (2,0) and (2,1),t h i si sc l e a r l y
the case. If the ﬁrms decide to share at (2,0) and (2,1), then because the lagging ﬁrm has no
bargaining power, its payoﬀ i st h es a m ea si ft h e yd on o ts h a r e .
We compute this payoﬀ by working backwards. After completing the two steps of research,
the ﬁrm produces output as a duopolist to earn e πD = πD
r . To complete the second step of
research, the ﬁrm invests a ﬂow cost of c and in each instant the probability of success is α.




αe πD − c
´
dt = αh πD−c
α+r . To complete the ﬁrst step















α+r .T h i sp a y o ﬀ is strictly positive









,( 1 1 )
which is the inequality that deﬁnes Region A.
B Proof of Proposition 1
In Region A, by deﬁnition, no ﬁrm ever drops out of the game. To solve for the MPE, we only
need to determine whether ﬁrms share at the six asymmetric histories. We derive the equilib-
rium sharing conditions for (1,0),(2,0) and (2,1). The three mirror histories (0,1),(0,2), and
(1,2) have the same analysis. To derive the sharing conditions, we use backwards induction to
solve for the MPE. To prove the proposition, we compare the equilibrium sharing conditions
at (1,0) and (2,1) for every MPE.
T h el a s th i s t o r yi s(2,2). At (2,2),e a c hﬁrm produces output and earns discounted duopoly
34proﬁts of
V1 (2,2) = V2 (2,2) = e πD. (12)
Working backwards, the next history is (2,1). The ﬁrms are willing to share at (2,1) iﬀ this
maximizes their joint proﬁts. The sharing condition (2) is
VJ (2,2) >V J (2,1;NS). (13)
Joint proﬁts under sharing are VJ (2,2) = V1 (2,2) + V2 (2,2) = 2e πD. Joint proﬁts under no
sharing are
VJ (2,1;NS)=V1 (2,1,NS)+V2 (2,1,NS)=
πM +2 αe πD − c
α + r
,( 1 4 )
where
V1 (2,1;NS)=
πM + αV1 (2,2)
α + r
=
πM + αe πD
α + r
since ﬁrm 1 earns monopoly proﬁts until ﬁrm 2 completes the second step and
V2 (2,1;NS)=
αV2 (2,2) − c
α + r
=
αe πD − c
α + r
(15)
since ﬁrm 2 invests until it completes the second step.
The sharing condition (13) simpliﬁes to 2e πD(α + r) >π M +2 αe πD − c or
2πD − (πM − c) > 0 (16)
This condition holds, strictly fails, or holds as an equality. We consider each possibility in
turn.
Case 1: The sharing condition at (2,1) holds. For parameter values such that the
sharing condition (16) holds, the ﬁrms share step 2 at (2,1). Before considering the sharing
decision at (1,0), we need to see whether the ﬁrms share step 1 at (2,0). The sharing condition
(2) is VJ (2,1) >V J (2,0;NS).J o i n tp r o ﬁts under sharing are VJ (2,1) = VJ (2,2) = 2e πD since
the ﬁrms share at (2,1) after sharing at (2,0). Joint proﬁts under no sharing are
VJ (2,0;NS)=V1 (2,0;NS)+V2 (2,0;NS)
=
πM + αV1 (2,1)
α + r
+
αV2 (2,1) − c
α + r
=
πM + αVJ (2,1) − c
α + r
=
πM + α2e πD − c
α + r
.
35The sharing condition VJ (2,1) >V J (2,0;NS) simpliﬁes to
2e πD (α + r) >π M +2 αe πD − c
c>π M − 2πD.
This is condition (16), which we have assumed to hold. Hence, the ﬁrms share step 1 at (2,0).
The joint payoﬀsa r e2e πD.
At (1,0), the sharing condition (2) is VJ (1,1) >V J (1,0;NS). Joint proﬁts under sharing
are VJ (1,1) = 2V1 (1,1) where
V1 (1,1) =
αV1 (1,2) + αV1 (2,1) − c
2α + r
=
αVJ (2,1) − c
2α + r
=
2αe πD − c
2α + r
(17)
Joint proﬁts under no sharing are
VJ (1,0;NS)=
αVJ (2,0) + αVJ (1,1) − 2c
2α + r
=
2αe πD + αVJ (1,1) − 2c
2α + r
.
The sharing condition simpliﬁes to
(2α + r)VJ (1,1) > 2αe πD + αVJ (1,1) − 2c.( 1 8 )
Substituting for VJ (1,1) in (18) we get
πD + c>0,( 1 9 )
which is trivially true. This proves the monotonicity result for all parameter values for which
the sharing condition (16) holds. In the unique MPE for these parameter values, the ﬁrms
share at (2,1) and (1,0). The sharing pattern is (S,S).
Case 2. The sharing condition at (2,1) fails strictly. For parameter values such that
the sharing condition (16) strictly fails, the ﬁrms do not share at (2,1). Before considering
the sharing decision at (1,0), we need to see whether the ﬁrms share at (2,0).T h e s h a r i n g
condition (2) is VJ (2,1) >V J (2,0;NS). Joint proﬁts are under no sharing are
VJ (2,0;NS)=V1 (2,0;NS)+V2 (2,0;NS)
=
πM + αV1 (2,1)
α + r
+
αV2 (2,1) − c
α + r
=
πM + αVJ (2,1) − c
α + r
.
The sharing condition simpliﬁes to
VJ (2,1) >
πM + αVJ (2,1) − c
α + r
36Since the ﬁrms do not share at (2,1), we can substitute for VJ (2,1) from (14). Simplifying,
we get c>π M − 2πD. This is the same as condition (16) which does not hold. Hence, the
ﬁrms do not share step 1 at (2,0).
At (1,0), the sharing condition (2) is VJ (1,1) >V J (1,0;NS). Joint proﬁts under no
sharing are
VJ (1,0;NS)=
αVJ (2,0) + αVJ (1,1) − 2c
2α + r
.( 2 0 )
The sharing condition simpliﬁes to (α + r)VJ (1,1) >α V J (2,0) − 2c. We can substitute for
VJ (1,1) = 2V2 (1,1).W eh a v e
VJ (1,1) = 2
αV2 (1,2) + αV2 (2,1) − c
2α + r
=2
αVJ (2,1) − c
2α + r
=2
α(πM +2 αe πD) − c(2α + r)
(2α + r)(α + r)
,
where the last equality follows from (14). Since there is no sharing at either (2,0) or (2,1),w e
use (14) to get
VJ (2,0) =
πM + αVJ (2,1) − c
α + r
=
(2α + r)πM +2 α2e πD − c(2α + r)
(α + r)
2 .
Substituting for VJ (1,1) and VJ (2,0), the sharing condition simpliﬁes to
c>(πM − 2πD) −
2(α + r)2
(2α + r)2(πM − πD). (21)
Since πM >π D, this condition is easier to satisfy than (16). For parameter values such that
the sharing condition (21) holds, there is a unique MPE such that the ﬁrms share at (1,0)
but not at (2,1). The sharing pattern is (S,NS). For parameter values such that the sharing
condition (21) strictly fails, there is a unique MPE such that the ﬁrms do not share at either
(1,0) or (2,1). The sharing pattern is (NS,NS). For parameter values such that the sharing
condition (21) holds with equality, there are two MPE that diﬀer based on whether the ﬁrms
choose S or NS at (1,0). The sharing pattern is either (S,NS) or (NS,NS).
Case 3. The sharing condition at (2,1) holds with equality. When c = πM −2πD,
the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between sharing and not sharing at (2,1).W ek n o wf r o ma b o v et h a t
the sharing condition at (2,0) is the same as the sharing condition at (2,1),s ot h eﬁrms are
indiﬀerent between sharing and not sharing at (2,0). There are multiple equilibria because the
ﬁrms may choose either S or NS at (2,0). Regardless of their choices, the sharing condition
at (1,0) is given by both (19) and (21) which coincide and hold trivially. Hence, the sharing
pattern is either (S,NS) or (S,S).
37C Calculation of the licensing fees
The leading ﬁrm sets the licensing fee according to equation (1), so that the lagging ﬁrm is
just indiﬀerent between sharing and not sharing. At (2,1), t h el i c e n s i n gf e ei s




where the last equality makes use of (12) and (15). At (1,0), the licensing fee is
F(1,0) = V2 (1,1) − V2 (1,0;NS).
We can substitute for V2 (1,1) from (17). V2 (1,0;NS) is given by
V2 (1,0;NS)=
αV2 (1,1) + αV2 (2,0) − c
2α + r
.( 2 3 )
Since the lagging ﬁrm has no bargaining power at (2,0),i t sp r o ﬁti sV2 (2,0;NS) even though
the ﬁrms share at (2,0). Similarly, its proﬁta t(2,1) is V2 (2,1;NS) even though the ﬁrms
share at (2,1). Using (15), we have
V2 (2,0) = V2 (2,0;NS)=
αV2 (2,1) − c
α + r
=
α2e πD − c(2α + r)
(α + r)
2















Comparing the fees F(1,0) and F(2,1),w eﬁnd that F(2,1) >F(1,0) iﬀ r




D Proof of Proposition 2
We solve for the equilibria of the game for all parameter values in a companion appendix (see
footnote 17). Here, we derive the non-monotonic equilibrium discussed in the paper. In the
companion appendix, this region is labeled as Region 6. The equilibria for other parameter
values are solved similarly.






















<π M < 2πD + c. This is a subregion of Region B. A straight-













38To ﬁnd an equilibrium, we work backwards from the end of the game. We derive the
continuation proﬁts at each history and solve for the equilibrium actions. For symmetric
histories such as (2,1) and (1,2), we analyze only one of the histories as the analysis is the
same for both.
The last history is the history (2,2). At this history, the ﬁrms produce output and each
earns discounted duopoly proﬁts of Vi(2,2) = e πD. Working backwards, the next history is
(2,1).T h eﬁrms are willing to share at (2,1) iﬀ this maximizes their joint proﬁts. The sharing
condition (2) is VJ(2,2) >V J(2,1;NS). The payoﬀ VJ(2,1;NS) depends on whether ﬁrm 2
invests. If ﬁrm 2 invests at (2,1;NS), its continuation proﬁti s
V2 (2,1;NS)=
αe πD − c
α + r
. (24)
This payoﬀ is positive because by assumption πD >cr
α. Hence, ﬁrm 2 invests at (2,1;NS).
Since ﬁrm 2 invests at (2,1;NS), the analysis of the sharing condition is the same as the
one in section (B), we do not repeat here. The ﬁrms share at (2,1) iﬀ (16) holds. This condition
holds in this region and the ﬁrms share step 2 at (2,1).
At the history (1,1),e a c hﬁrm has one success. There is no sharing decision to be made.
The ﬁrms must, however, decide whether to invest to develop the second step. Assuming ﬁrm
1 invests, ﬁrm 2 will also invest if
V2 (1,1) =
αV2 (2,1) + αV2 (1,2) − c
2α + r
=
αVJ (2,1) − c
2α + r
> 0.
Since the ﬁrms share at (2,1), VJ (2,1) = 2e πD. Substituting we get
V2 (1,1) =
2αe πD − c
2α + r
> 0,( 2 5 )
which simpliﬁes to πD > cr
2α. Since this condition holds by assumption in this region, ﬁrm 2
invests. Hence, each ﬁrm invests at (1,1) if the other does.
If ﬁrm 1 does not invest at (1,1), the new history is (X,1). Firm 2 invests if
V2 (X,1) =
αV2 (X,2) − c
α + r
=
αe πM − c
α + r
> 0,( 2 6 )
where V2 (X,2) = e πM because ﬁrm 2 produces output as a monopolist at (X,2). The condition
simpliﬁes to πM >cr
α, which holds because πM >π Dand in this region πD >cr
α. Hence, ﬁrm
2 invests at (X,1). It follows that both ﬁrms invest at (1,1).
39At the history (2,0),the sharing condition is VJ(2,1) >V J(2,0;NS). The payoﬀ VJ(2,0;NS)
depends on whether ﬁrm 2 invests. Firm 2 invests iﬀ
V2 (2,0;NS)=
αV2 (2,1) − c
α + r
> 0.










which fails in this region, so ﬁrm 2 drops out at (2,0) if the ﬁrms do not share.
At (2,0), joint proﬁts under sharing are VJ (2,1) = 2e πD since if the ﬁrms share, the
game reaches the history (2,1) and the ﬁrms share step 2.J o i n tp r o ﬁts under no sharing are
VJ (2,0;NS)=V1 (2,X)=e πM since ﬁrm 2 drops out of the game if the ﬁrms do not share.
Thus, the sharing condition at (2,0) simpliﬁes to
2πD − πM > 0 (27)
In this region, we have that πM > 2πD.H e n c e ,t h eﬁrms do not share at (2,0). The lagging
ﬁrm then drops out of the game.
Working backwards from either (2,0) or (1,1), we next consider the history (1,0).A t
this history, ﬁrm 1 has one success and ﬁrm 2 has no successes. The sharing condition is
VJ(1,1) >V J(1,0;NS). The payoﬀ VJ(1,0;NS) depends on whether each ﬁrm invests. If ﬁrm
1 invests, ﬁr m2a l s oi n v e s t si f
V2 (1,0;NS)=
αV2 (1,1) + αV2 (2,0) − c
2α + r
> 0 (28)
We can substitute for V2 (1,1) from (25). Moreover, V2 (2,0) = 0 since the ﬁrms do not share












This holds in the region, so the lagging ﬁrm 2 invests at (1,0;NS) if ﬁrm 1 does. It is
straightforward to show that the leading ﬁrm 1 also invests at (1,0;NS) if ﬁrm 2 invests. If
ﬁrm 2 does not invest, the history becomes (1,X) and the leading ﬁrm invests as shown above.
It follows that the leading ﬁrm invests at (1,0;NS) whether or not the lagging ﬁrm invests.
Thus, both ﬁrms invest at (1,0;NS).
40At (1,0), joint proﬁts under no sharing are
VJ (1,0;NS)=
αVJ (2,0) + αVJ (1,1) − 2c
2α + r
=
αe πM + αVJ (1,1) − 2c
2α + r
. (29)
The sharing condition, VJ(1,1) >V J(1,0;NS),s i m p l i ﬁes to
αe πM + αVJ (1,1) − 2c<(2α + r)VJ (1,1)












.( 3 0 )
This inequality fails in the region, so the ﬁrms do not share at (1,0).
At the history (0,0), assuming ﬁrm 2 invests, ﬁrm 1 will also invest if
V1 (0,0) =
αV1 (1,0;NS)+αV1 (0,1;NS) − c
2α + r
=
αVJ (1,0;NS) − c
2α + r
> 0
Substituting from (29) and (25), we get
4απD +( 2 α + r)πM > (4α + r)(2α + r)
r
α2c +2 cr.
Since πM > 2πD in this region, the condition holds if




















c>(4α + r)(2α + r)
r
α2c +2 cr.
This simpliﬁes to 2α(2α + r) > 0, which always holds. Hence, ﬁrm 1 invests at (0,0) if ﬁrm 2
invests.



























. These two conditions together
imply that (31) holds. Hence, ﬁrm 1 invests at (0,X). It follows that both ﬁrms invest at
(0,0). This completes the derivation of the equilibrium. The equilibrium is unique.
41E Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is a straightforward generalization of our results for Region A of the basic model.33
To save space, we do not present a complete proof. Instead, we focus on the subregion of
Region A where, due to the asymmetry in their research costs, the ﬁrms share at (2,1), but
not at (1,2).34 We solve the game backwards. At (2,1), the sharing condition is VJ (2,2) >
VJ (2,1;NS).T h i sy i e l d s
2e πD >V J (2,1;NS)=
πM + α2e πD − c2
α + r
.
This simpliﬁes to c2 > 2πD − πM. Similarly, the ﬁrms share at (1,2) if c1 > 2πD − πM.
From now on we consider the subregion of Region A such that c2 >π M − 2πD >c 1.I nt h i s
subregion, the ﬁrms share at (2,1), but not at (1,2).A t(2,0), the sharing condition is
VJ (2,1) >V J (2,0;NS)=
πM + αVJ (2,1) − c2
α + r
.
Using VJ (2,1) = 2e πD, this simpliﬁes to c2 > 2πD − πM. This holds, so the ﬁrms share at
(2,0).
At (0,2), the sharing condition is
VJ (1,2) >V J (0,2;NS)=




VJ (1,2) = VJ (1,2;NS)=
πM + α2e πD − c1
α + r
,
the sharing condition simpliﬁes to c1 > 2πD − πM. This does not hold, so the ﬁrms do not
share at (0,2).
At (1,0), the sharing condition is VJ (1,1) >V J (1,0;NS). Joint proﬁts at (1,1) are
VJ (1,1) =
αVJ (2,1) + αVJ (1,2) − c2 − c1
2α + r
.( 3 2 )
Joint proﬁts at (1,0;NS) are
VJ (1,0;NS)=
αVJ (1,1) + αVJ (2,0) − c2 − c1
2α + r
.





α). This condition is the drop out condition for
ﬁrm 2 (the ineﬃcient ﬁr m )a tt h eh i s t o r y(2,0). The proof is similar to Lemma 1.
34When the ﬁr m sd on o ts h a r ea te i t h e r(2,1) or (1,2), the sharing pattern is monotonic regardless of the
sharing decisions at (1,0) and (0,1). When the ﬁrms share at both (2,1) and (1,2), the derivation of the result
is a straightforward generalization of the symmetric case.
42Substituting for VJ (2,0) = VJ (2,1) = 2e πD and VJ (1,2) = VJ (1,2,NS)=πM+α2h πD−c1
α+r , the
sharing condition at (1,0) simpliﬁes to πM +c2 > 0. This holds trivially, so the ﬁrms share at
(1,0). Thus, the monotonicity property holds for ﬁrm 1 in the subregion.
Because the ﬁrms do not share at (1,2), the monotonicity property holds for ﬁrm 2 whether
or not the ﬁrms share at (0,1) in the subregion. The sharing condition at (0,1) is VJ (1,1) >
VJ (0,1;NS) where
VJ (0,1;NS)=
αVJ (1,1) + αVJ (0,2) − c2 − c1
2α + r
.
Using (32) and substituting for VJ (2,1) = 2e πD, VJ (1,2,NS)=πM+α2h πD−c1
α+r , and VJ (0,2) =
VJ (0,2,NS)=
πM+αVJ(1,2)−c1
α+r , the sharing condition at (0,1) simpliﬁes to
c2(α + r)2 +( 2 πD + c1)(2α + r)2 − πMα(3α +2 r) > 0.
This can be rewritten as
(α + r)2
(2α + r)2(2πD + c1 + c2)+( 1−
(α + r)2
(2α + r)2)(2πD + c1 − πM) > 0.( 3 3 )
It is straightforward to show using the other constraints that deﬁne this subregion that condi-
tion (33) always holds. Thus, the ﬁrms share at (1,0) and the sharing pattern is (S,NS).
F Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is a straightforward generalization of our results for Region A of the basic model.35
To save space, we do not present a complete proof. Instead, we show why the monotonicity
property for ﬁrm 1 does not always hold in Region A and derive the equations discussed in the
text.
We solve the game by working backwards through the histories. At (2,1),t h es h a r i n g
condition is
VJ (2,2) >V J (2,1;NS)=




Using VJ (2,2) = 2e πD, this simpliﬁes to 2πD − (πM − c2
2) > 0.Similarly, the ﬁrms share
at (1,2) i fa n do n l yi f2πD − (πM − c1) > 0. From now on, we consider the subregion of













α }.W h e n t h i s
condition holds, ﬁrm 1 does not drop out at (0,2) and ﬁrm 2 does not drop out at (2,0).T h e p r o o f i s a
straightforward generalization of Lemma 1.
43Region A where both of these conditions hold, so the ﬁrms share at (2,1) and (1,2).W eh a v e
VJ (2,1) = VJ (1,2) = 2e πD.
At (2,0), the sharing condition is
VJ (2,1) >V J (2,0;NS)=




Using VJ (2,1) = 2e πD, this simpliﬁes to 2πD−(πM−c1
2) > 0.F r o mn o wo n ,w ea s s u m et h i sa l s o
holds so that the ﬁrms share at (2,0). Similarly, the ﬁrms share at (0,2) iﬀ 2πD−(πM−c1) > 0.
This is the same condition as the condition for sharing at (1,2),s oi th o l d s .S ot h eﬁrms share
at (2,0) and (0,2).W eh a v eVJ (2,0) = VJ (0,2) = 2e πD.
The monotonicity property for ﬁrm 1 holds if and only if the ﬁrms share at (1,0). The
sharing condition is VJ (1,1) >V J (1,0;NS).T h ej o i n tp a y o ﬀ at (1,1) is
VJ (1,1) =








The joint payoﬀ at (1,0;NS) is
VJ (1,0;NS)=




Substituting for VJ (2,0) = 2e πD and VJ (1,1), the sharing condition simpliﬁes to






) > 0.( 3 4 )
As u ﬃcient condition for sharing at (1,0) is that c1
2 − c2
2 > 0. However, there are parameters
in this subregion such that c1
2 −c2
2 < 0 and the sharing condition fails. The ﬁrms do not share
at (1,0) and the equilibrium is not monotonic.
44